

**THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**

19 May 1983

National Intelligence Council

NOTE TO: DCI

We were in the process of preparing a commentary for you on the Lebanese situation when we received word of your need for specific talking points for your meeting with the secretary; we have expanded our commentary slightly to cover that requirement.

I continue to be impressed with the degree of Arab support for the Lebanese accords. No Arab state is really happy about watching another Arab state sign a peace settlement with Israel, but it is remarkable how few have taken cheap shots at it in the way they have traditionally done. It is too early to predict exactly what this means, but it may be a major advance forward toward greater moderation on the part of all but a tiny handful of states. It will be important to watch whether this is a more long-lived phenomenon or a transitory situation.

If the phenomenon is in fact something of a watershed, it could have great positive implications for further peace efforts. It would also ensure that Syria will remain isolated, even in another conflict with Israel.

We remain concerned over the nature of the Syrian-Soviet relationship. This dynamic has not yet been fully explored. That they have certain common interests is abundantly clear. What is more important is to try to determine where longer range Soviet and Syrian interests differ. That should

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
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tell us more about Soviet strategic intentions --
as distinct from Syria's. I consider it fully
possible that the USSR can pursue a two track policy:

- on the one hand support Syria militarily
to show Soviet strength in the region;
- simultaneously woo the Arab moderates
politically to convince them that Soviet
interests and goals are identical to
theirs and that they should bring the
USSR onto their side in seeking a broader
Middle East settlement.

We will get to you shortly a concise analysis of
this Syrian-Soviet relationship.



Graham E. Fuller
NIO/NESA

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